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Welfare Dominance: An Application to Commodity Taxation
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we suggest a method which enables the user to identify
commodities that all individuals who can agree on certain weak assumptions
with regard to the social welfare function will agree upon as worth
subsidizing or taxing in the absence of efficiency considerations. The method
is based on an extension of the stochastic dominance criteria and is












A principal weakness of the theory of optimal taxation with
heterogeneous taxpayers is the dependence of the optimum tax rates on the
exact properties of the social welfare function. While othercomponents of
the problem, such as the excess burden of the tax system, canpresumably be
recovered from empirical observations on the behavior ofconsumers, it is
clear that estimating the social welfare function is not aneasy task.
Although there have been severaL attempts to recover the social welfare
function using the revealed preferences of governments, (usuallyby assuming
that governments are acting optimally according to a "just" principal of
taxation, such as equal sacrifice), all of these methods requirevery strong
assumptions which are unlikely to command wide support.
This problem Is especially disturbing for developing countries which
rely heavily on commodity taxes as a major policy instrument for raising
revenue and changing the income distribution. In most of these countries data
is not available even for estimating the excess burden of the taxsystem.
Therefore, it seems that the theory of optimal commodity taxation is notvery
helpful as an input into policy formulation in this context. This problem is
even more complicated from the perspective of an economic adviser whose role
is to advise the government of a specific country. If, in an idealcase, the
government can supply him with all the necessary data, then the "cost" or the
1. See Musgrave (1959), Mera (1969), Weisbrod (1968), Piggott (1982), Yaari
(1986).—2—
inefficiency caused by the tax system can be estimated. However, in order to
make recommendations about optimal tax design, the adviser must be aware of
the preferences of the government (or the society) involved. Without this
information the advice rendered represents only the adviser's preferences,
which need not be the same as the preferences of the government seeking
advice. Hence, it will be convenient to see whether it is possible to
overcome this difficulty by statistical analysis.
The aim of this paper is to suggest a method which enables the user
to identify commodities that all individuals who can agree on certain weak
assumptions with regard to social policy will agree upon as worth subsidizing
or taxing in the absence of efficiency considerations. If such commodities
can be identified, then the task of advising the government on optimal
directions of tax reform will be rendered nearly value—free. In other words,
all individuals would agree that the taxation of one commodity should be
reduced in favor of heavier taxation on another, if the marginal excess burden
is equal for the two commodities.
The specific question this paper addresses is the following: assume
that the government wants to make an equal yield change in its commodity tax
system by subsidizing one commodity and taxing another commodity by an
additional dollar ——isit possible to identify two such commodities such that
social welfare increases for all concave Paretian social welfare functions?
If such situations can be identified, the preferred direction of tax reform
can be located without detailed knowledge of preferences regarding inter-
personal transfers. Alternatively, If such commodities cannot be found, it—3—
will be clear that it is impossible to make recommendations in the absence of
further information about the governing social welfare function.
The methodology which enables us to answer this question was
originally developed in the finance literature, where it is referred to as the
Second—Degree Stochastic Dominance Criteria. The main idea is to assume that
the criteria which is used to rank prospects (portfolios) is expected utility,
and that the investigator assumes only that the marginal utility of income is
non—negative and non—increasing. Based on these assumptions, rules for
ranking prospects have been developed (e. g., Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch
and Levy (1969)).
Our intention is to use the methodology of stochastic dominance for
ranking taxes on different commodities. As has been demonstrated by Atkinson
(1970), there is a formal similarity between the ranking of income
distributions and the ranking of prospects. Hence, the use of stochastic
dominance rules in welfare economics is a natural development following from
Atkinson's observation. However, since taxation and in particular commodity
taxation affect social welfare in a slightly different way than the effect of
a prospect on the utility function, several changes must be made to the
methodology; we refer to these adapted rules as welfare dominance. VThe
major changes are the following:
2. This term was coined by Shorrocks (1983).—4—
(a) In the finance literature, the main interest is to rank portfolios,
the analogy to which in our study is the ranking of income distributions. Our
goal, though, is the ranking of (taxes on) commodities, expenditure on which
is a component of total income. Therefore, we have to use conditional
stochastic dominance rules, which can be translated into the finance liter-
ature as asking whether asset A dominates asset B given that the investor has
also to hold portfolio C. In the case of welfare dominance, the same formal
question can be interpreted as whether subsidizing expenditure on commodity A
instead of expenditure on commodity B improves welfare, given that the income
distribution is C.
(b) We are interested in dominance at the margin. The analogy to finance
is whether a small increase in the share of asset A at the expense of asset B
(given that the rest of the portfolio held is C) increases expected utility.
In the case of taxation, the same formal question can be interpreted as
whether a small decrease in tax on A financed by a small increase in tax on B,
(given that the income distribution is C), increases expected welfare.
As we show in the next section, this question can be answered by
comparing concentration curves. The concentration curve is a diagram which is
similar to the Lorenz curve. On the horizontal axis the households are
ordered according to their income, while the vertical axis describes the
cumulative percentage of the total expenditure on a specific commodity that is
spent by the families whose incomes are less than or equal to the specified
income level. The concentration curve, like the Lorenz curve, passes through
the origin. But, unlike the Lorenz curve, it need not always be increasing,—5—
and its curvature depends on the income elasticity of the commodity. In
particular, if the curve is convex (concave) to the origin then the income
elasticity is negative (positive). i
If the concentration curve of one commodity is above the
concentration curve of another commodity, then the first commodity dominates
the second. However, if the concentration curves intersect, then it is
impossible to show dominance. In other words, only if concentration curves do
not intersect will all social welfare functions show that the tax change
increases welfare. We refer to these rules as Marginal Conditional
Stochastic Dominance rules (hereafter MCSD rules) and in the rest of the
paper, dominates stands for marginal conditional stochastic dominates).
The structure of the paper is the following: the next section
provides an intuitive proof for MCSD rules. In the third section, additional,
insight is gained by relating these rules to a methodology based on the
decomposition of the Gini coefficient. Section IV uses data from Israel in
order to illustrate the methodology. The paper concludes with suggestions for
further research.
3. For a detailed analysis of the curvature of concentrationcurves, see
Kakwani (1981) and Yitzhaki and 01km (1987).
4. It is worth noting that concentration curves have been used to describe
the progressivity of taxes by many investigators. See, among others,
Suits (1977a, 1977b), Clotfelter (1977), Kakwani (1977,1981,1984), Kiefer
(1984), Rock (1983), Formby, Smith and Sykes (1986). However, the use of
concentration curves to identify tax changes which are welfare dominating
is new.—6—
II. Intuitive Derivation of the Methodology.
Assume that tax policies are evaluated according to an additively
separable social welfare function, which is the sum of identical individual
utility functions. All that is known about the social welfare function is
that the marginal utility of Income is positive and declining. Formally,
w =
whereI is income and P are prices and all that is known about V is
av a2v that _r>O and <0.
a'
Now suppose that the government is considering a small increase in
the tax on commodity i and a small decrease in the tax on commodity j so that
total revenue does not change. Let x1 denote the consumption of commodity I
by the hth individual, where the individuals are arranged in a non—decreasing
order of income. Let X denotes total consumption of commodity i. Since the
change in revenue raised is zero, there is a link between the change in prices
of commodity i and j. Assuming no change in the quantities consumed or in the
producer prices, the relationship is:
5. In Yitzhaki and 01km (1987), Marginal Conditional Stochastic Dominance
rules are developed in the context of portfolio analysis. Since the
proofs are identical to those required in this paper, we refer the
interested reader to that paper. In this section an intuitive proof is
given.—7—
dP X + dP. X. =0
hence
(1) dP =— (Xi!X1} dP3
Consider the welfare of the poorest person in the society. Denote
his consumption of commodity i and commodity j by x1 and x1. Anecessary
condition that all social welfare functions show that the suggested reform is
welfare increasing is that the reform does not worsen the utility of the
poorest individual. (Otherwise a Rawisian decision maker will judge that the
suggested reform decreases welfare). The effect of the reform on the welfare
of the poorest in the society depends on the compensation needed to allow him
to have the same utility as before. That is, it depends on the sign of
1 1
(2) x. dP. + x. dP.
1 1 •] •J
andif (2) is negative, then the welfare of the poorestperson has been
increased as a result of the reform.
Substituting for dP from equation (1), we get:
(3) [x IX. — x'/ XJ X, dP.
.3 .3 1 1 3 .3
Since Xj is positive, anddP is negative by assumption, the sign of (3)
depends on whether the term in the square brackets is positive. But this
expression is the difference between the poorest's individual's share of
consumption of commodity j to his share of commodity i. Hence, anecessary—8—
condItion that all social welfare functions show an increase in social welfare
is that the share of the expenditure of the poorest individual on commodity i
is lower than his share in the expenditure on commodity j. Having established
the condition for a socially acceptable reform with regard to the poorest
Individual, we next check the condition applying to the second individual.
The marginal utility of income of the second individual is lower than the
marginal utility of income of the first individual, hence all social welfare
functions will show an increase in social welfare if the gain in income for
the first individual is higher than the loss for the second individual. By
repeating the same considerations which led to (3), the condition with regard
to the second Individual is:
(4) {[x +x]/X.—[x+x?J/X.}X. dl'. <0
3 3 3 1 1 1 3 3
andthe condition for the kth individual is
(5) (Ekh/X —Ekx'/X.} X. dP. <0
h=1 jj h=11i.j
Condition(5) is easy to interpret. In brackets is the difference
between the relative concentration curve of commodity i and the relative
concentration curve of commodity j.Thecondition implies that for all social
welfare functions to show that this tax change increases social welfare it is
necessary that the concentration curve of commodity i with respect to income
is at least as high as the concentration curve of commodity j at each point in
the income distribution. Condition (5) is also a sufficient one because if
the condition is violated it is possible to construct a concave Paretian
welfare function which Indicates that the tax reform decreases social welfare.—9—
Note that condition (5) does not constitute a complete ordering of
(commodity) taxes. That is, if two concentration curves intersect, then it
will be impossible to find a small change in the taxation of the commodities
involved that all social welfare functions judge to be an increase in
welfare. If we insist on having a complete ordering, then we have to further
investigate the concentration curves to see whether restricting the class of
social welfare function enables us to classify policies. This issue is
discussed in the next section.
Although the ordering is not complete, it is clearly transitive: if
commodity A dominates commodity B and commodity B dominates C, then A
dominates C. This property enables us to establish an ordering among the
subgroup of commodities in which dominance is found.
Figure 1 presents some typical cases. On the horizontal axis of each
graph the cumulative distribution of income is plotted while the vertical axis
represents the difference between the concentration curve of commodity A and
the concentration curve of commodity B. In other words, on the vertical axis
we present the difference between the share of total expenditure on A and the
share of total expenditure on B for the poorest F families. All of the
"difference in concentration curves" (DCC curve hereafter, where the indices
indicate the commodities) include the origin and end up at [0,1]. If the
curve is above the horizontal axes then A dominates B, while if it is entirely
below the horizontal axes then B dominates A. If the curve crosses the
6. To see this, notice that if the concentration curve of A is everywhere
above the concentration curve of B, and the concentration curve of B is
everywhere above the concentration curve of C, then it is clear that the
concentration curve of A is everywhere above the concentation curve of C.— 10—
horizontalaxes then neither B dominates A nor A dominates B. In the next
section we show that the area between the difference in concentration curves
and the horizontal axis is equal to the difference in the income elasticities
of the two commodities.
Until now, we have been interested in an increase of the subsidy to
one commodity that is financed by an increase of the tax on another
commodity. The same methodology can be used to ask whether an increase in a
subsidy that is financed by a proportional income tax Increases welfare. In
this case we treat total income as a commodity and look at the difference
between the concentration curve for commodity i and the Lorenz curve. If the
DCC10, where the index 0 Indicates the Lorenz curve, is always positive, then
commodity i dominates the proportional tax.
III. Restricting the Social Welfare Functions.
As noted above, the MCSD rules do not form a complete ordering over
the taxable commodities. Moreover, we suspect that there are many commodities
that will be impossible to order by this method. In these cases one may wish— 11—
toinvestigate further restrictions on the set of possible welfare functions,
such as third degree stochastic dominance rules. ii
The main problem with such rules is that their use does not ensure a
complete ordering in all cases. Therefore, their use may increase the set of
commodities over which an ordering is defined, but it does not eliminate the
problem of incomplete ordering. An alternative way that ensures a complete
ordering is to restrict ourselves to necessary conditions for stochastic
dominance. This Is the case where the analysis of tax reforms is carried out
with the use of the Cmi coefficient (Yitzhaki (1987)). This procedure
provides a complete ordering, however, it will be impossible to show that the
suggested ordering may be rejected by all social welfare functions. Another
approach which ensures a complete ordering is to use a specific welfare
function, but then we may abandon the connection to MCSD rules.
The area below the forty—five degree line minus the area below the
concentration curve is defined as one—half of the concentration ratio. As
shown In Yitzhaki and 01km (1987), this area is also equal to:
(6) =cov(X,F(Y))/m
where is one half of the concentration ratio,m is the mean expenditure on
commodity i, and F(Y) is the cumulative distribution of income. In other
words, the concentration ratio is equal to twice the covariance between the
expenditure on commodity i and the cumulative distribution of income divided
7. For a definition of third degree stochastic dominance, see Whitmore
(1970).— 12—
bythe mean expenditure on commodity i. Hence the area between the
concentration curve of commodity i and the concentration curve of commodity 3
(i.e. between the DCC3 curve and the horizontal axis) is:
(7) —Cj = cov(X,F(Y))Im—cov(X3,F(Y)) /m3
By dividing and multiplying equation (7) by cov(Y,F(Y)) and my, respectively,
we can rewrite (7) as:
(8)
1DCC3(F) dF =Cb/S1—b3/S3} G
where is the Cmi coefficient of income, Si is the share of the
expenditure on X1 and
(9) bj cov(X1,F(Y))/cov(Y,F(Y))
is Siever's (1983) non—parametric estimator of the slope of the regression
line of Xj on Y. In our context b is a weighted mean of the marginal
propensity to spend on commodity i. As argued in Yitzhaki (1987), b/S can
be interpreted as the weighted average income elasticity of commodity i.
Hence equation (9) tells us that the sign of the area below the DCC3 curve is
determined by the difference between the weighted average income elasticities
of the commodities. Because for commodity i to dominate commodity 3DCCjj
must be positive, it is clear that a necessary condition (but, of course, not— 13—
sufficient)for welfare dominance is that the income elasticity of commodity i
is lower than the income elasticity of commodity j.
One can repeat the same argument using the extended Cmi. The
extended Cmi is a weighted integral of the area between the forty—five degree
line and the Lorenz curve. The formula for the extended Cmi is:
(10) G(Y) =— vcov(Y,[1—F(Y)J1) /my v>1
where v is a parameter chosen by the investigator. The extended Cmi is
similar to the Cmi coefficient except that it uses a different weighting
scheme. The Cmi is a special case of the extended Cmi where v is 2. The
higher is v, the more the bottom of the income distribution is stressed. §1
The above analysis using the Cmi can be carried out using the
extended Cmi. In the appendix we show that an increase in the subsidy to
commodity i that is financed by an increase in the tax on commodity j
decreases the extended Cmi inequality index, if
(11) j1 (1F)2 dF >0,
where •(F) is the concentration curve. Since .(F) —4.(F)is the Dccm
curve, then the analysis of tax reform with the extended Cmi coefficient
provides additional necessary conditions for welfare dominance. If commodity
i dominates commodity j, then a shift from taxing commodity i to commodity j
8. See Yitzhaki (1983) for a discussion of the properties of the extended
Cmi.— 14—
mustdecrease the extended Cmi inequality index for all v, including the
standard Cmi case where v=2. These necessary conditions are useful in
empirical investigation of welfare dominance because they are fairly easy to
calculate and can be used to identify the pairs of commodities for which
welfare dominance is possible.
IV. An Illustration with Israeli Data.
This section illustrates the methodology of MCSD rules using cross—
section data on consumption of subsidized commodities in Israel. The data set
is the Survey of Family Expenditure (1979/80) conducted by the Central Bureau
of Statistics. This Survey consists of a random stratified sample of 2271
urban households. Since we are interested in level of economic well—being,
the concept of income per standard adult is used.2!Thehouseholds are
ordered according to total net income per standard adult, where total net
income is defined as monetary income plus imputed income from ownership of
housing and vehicles minus income and social security taxes.
Before presenting the results, two technical points are worth
9. The concept of standard adult is an equivalence scale intended to take
Into account the effect of the size of the household on consumption
needs. The scale that is used is the following: Single 1.25 standard
adults, a couple without children 2.0, a couple with one child 2.65, with
two children 3.2, with three children 3.75, with four children 4.2, and .4
for each additional child. It is used in many official publications of
the National Insurance Institute and the Central Bureau of Statistics of
Israel.
10. The sample is a weighted sample, which means that each household in the
sample represents a different number of households in the population. The
equations given in this paper have therefore been adjusted in a straight-
forward way to account for this, See Lerman and Yitzhaki (1986)— 15—
making.In general, if there are n commodities, one would have to plot
n •(n—1)/2pairs of concentration curves to investigate the existence of
welfare dominance. Since cross—section samples usually contain thousands of
observations, this can clearly become a cumbersome procedure when more than a
few commodities are being studied. As suggested above, comparisons of the
magnitude of the weighted income elasticities, according to the Gini or
extended Gird coefficient, yield necessary conditions for dominance, thus
reducing the number of comparisons of curves needed. The second issue arises
because of the use of a sample instead of the whole population. As shown by
Goldie (1967), sample—based Lorenz curves do converge to the population Lorenz
curve, but it is clear that our results may be affected by the sample
variability. One way to reduce the sample variability is to average
observations. Hence in what follows we plot concentration curves based on the
whole sample and also report the results when concentration curves are based
on averaging consecutive pairs of observations.
Table 1 presents weighted average income elasticities, estimated by
using several variants of the extended Cmi coefficient. As can be seen,
there are two inferior commodities, bread and cooking oil, while the other
commodities are normal.— 16—
Asmentioned above, the higher is v the more weight that is given to
the lower portion of the income distribution. Hence, we can conclude from the
table that the income elasticity of public transportation declines as income
Table 1: Income Elasticities of Several Subsidized Commodities
Israel, 1979/80
Gini parameter v =1.5 v=2 v= 4
Cooking OIl —.13 —.14 —.11
Bread —.06 —.07 —.09
Sugar .07 .06 .08
Public Transportation .12 .15 .25
Water for Household
Consumption .31 .30 .33
increases while bread tend to be less inferior, the higher the income. Since
the income elasticity of cooking oil is lower than the income elasticity of
bread for all v, the necessary conditions for cooking oil to dominate bread
are met, and it is reasonable to check whether cooking oil dominates bread.
By the same reasoning we conclude from Table 1 that, if there is dominance,
then the ordering must be: cooking oil, bread, sugar, public transportation
and finally water for household consumption. It is impossible that a good
will be dominated by another good lower in the table.— 17—
Figure2 presents the curve of the difference between the
concentration curves (Dcc curve) of cooking oil and bread. As expected from
Table 1, the area above the X—axis is larger than the area below it. (The
difference between the areas is equal to the income elasticity of cooking oil
minus bread calculated by the Cmi index). Hence, we can see that thecooking
oil is more inferior than bread when the weighting scheme of the Cmi is
used. However, the curve intersects the X—axis. This implies that for the
lower two deciles of the income distribution, bread has a lower income
elasticity than cooking oil, while for the other deciles bread has a higher
income elasticity. If the social welfare function is concave only for the
lower two deciles then taxation policy should shift to subsidize bread at the
expense cooking oil. The conclusion is that cooking oil does not dominate
bread.
Figure 3 presents the DCC curve between bread and water for household
consumption. As can be seen, the curve is always above the X—axis, and hence
bread dominates water.
Figure 4 presents the Dcc of bread and public transportation. As in
Figure 3, except for one observation, bread dominates public transportation.
11. A close examination of the individual observations reveals that thecurve
intersects the X—axis for the very last observation, so that the share of
the richest household in the sample, in total expenditure of bread, is
higher than his share in the overall expenditure in water. If this
sample exactly portrayed the population, a social welfare function that
is linear over the whole range of the distribution and concave between
the second richest family and the richest one would show that subsidizing
bread at the expense of water would be welfare decreasing. However, we
suspect that this is a result of the sampling error. If we take the
average of two consecutive observations, then this proviso disappears.— 18—
Ifwe plot the DCC averaging every two consecutive observations, then bread
dominates public transportation with no exceptions.
This phenomenon illustrates just how strong the condition of MCSD
is. Even if the entire population is studied, the consumption patterns of the
richest and poorest members of society are critical in determining the
existence of welfare dominance.
Figure 5 presents the DCC of bread minus the Lorenz curve. This
figure is intended to show whether an increase in the subsidy on bread that is
financed by an increase in proportional income tax increases welfare for all
additive concave Paretian social welfare functions. Because the DCC curve is
above the X—axis over the whole income range, the answer to this question is
yes.
V. Conclusions.
Since the exact properties of social welfare functions are not known,
and it is doubtful whether they can be recovered by future research, it would
be valuable to make judgments about potential tax reforms that depend only on
uncontroversial characteristics of the social welfare function. The method-
ology provided in this paper is a first step in this direction. It states the
conditions (called marginal conditional stochastic dominance rules) required
for all individuals with Paretian concave social welfare functions to agree
that an increase in the subsidy on one commodity, which is financed by an
increase of the tax on another commodity (or a proportional income tax),— 19—
increasessocial welfare. If this reform does not increase excess burden,
then all individuals will agree on the preferred direction of tax reform. An
inspection of Israeli data suggests that these conditions are quite commonly
observed in practice, making this a practically relevant point.
One direction for future research is to apply this methodology to a
weighted combination of commodities. In this case a set of changes in taxes
and subsidies can be compared to another set in order to see whether all
IndIviduals can agree on the welfare implications of particular tax reforms.
Another interesting challenge is to introduce efficiency considerations into
the analysis. In the present setting of MCSD rules, the permissable set of
welfare functions includes welfare functions which are almost linear (constant
marginal utility). The permissability of such welfare functions means that it
will be impossible to find unanimous preference for any redistribution that
increases efficiency costs. Therefore only by limiting the set of the admis-
sible welfare functions will it be possible to find MCSD rules for costly
redistribution. One possible way of doing that is to restrict the set such
that only welfare functions with some minimum concavity are included.— 20 —










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this appendix we prove the following results:
a. The derivative of the extended Gini of overall income withrespect to
constant revenue tax changes is equal to the difference in the (weighted)
concentration ratio of the commodities involved in the taxchanges.
b. The (weighted) concentration ratio is equal to the (weighted)area below
the concentration curve.
Properties (a) and (b) together with equation (2) ensure that anecessary
condition for a commodity to dominate another commodity is that the
extended Cmi of inequality declines as a result of the taxchanges.
Proof of property (a)
For simplicity of presentation, we assume continuousdistributions,
and two commodities
(A.1) Let y =p1x1 +P2x2
where p 1 is the price of commodity 1,y is income and
x represents commodities.
The extended Cmi of inequality is— 26—
(A.2) G(v) =— vcoy(y, [1F(y)]'') /m
where m is mean income.
The derivative of C(v) with respect to p1, evaluated at p1 =1can be
interpreted as the effect of a change in the tax on commodity 1 on the
extended Cmi. Note that p1 affects both the nominator and denominator of
(A.2). Let us start with the derivative of the nominator.
Let A(y) =l—F(y).
Note that
E {A V_l(y)} =F [l—F(y)J'f(y) dy
and by transformations of variables with F =F(y)
we get
(A.3) Ey (A1(Y)) = (1—F)''dF =
Using(A.3), the nominator of (A.2) can be written as
cov(y,A"(y)) = y(v A"'(y) -1)f(y) dy
and again using transformation of variables where F =F(y)— 27—
(A.4) coy (y,AV(y)) =fy(F)[v(i-F)1- 1] dF
where y(F) =inf{y : F(y) ￿ F)
is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function.




andby reversing the procedure that led from (A.2) to (A.4) weget
v-i
(A.6) 3 cov(y,A = coy(x1, [1—F(y)]")
p1
Now that the derivative of the numerator is known,wecan derive the




whereS =m/m is the share of x and
1ly 1
C(x1,y,v) =—vcov(x1,[1—F(y)]")/m1
is the (weighted) concentration
The effect of an equal
evaluated by using (A.7). Let
with respect to the tax reform.
index.
revenue tax change on the extended Cmi can be
denote the derivative of the extended Cmi
That is
ac (v) 3G (v)
= dp1+
9p1 ap2dp2
which means that the effect of the tax changes on the extended Cmi depends on
the difference between the concentration ratios of the commodities. This
completes the proof of (a).
Proof of Property (b).
Let x represent an expenditure on a commodity, then




and by using the restriction m1 dp1 +m2dp2 =0





writingthe covariance explicitly and eliminating zeros yield
(A.11) c(x,y,v) =_(v/m)E E {(x —mx)[1_F(y)}'
1
f(x,y) dx dy
Let g(y) =E(x1y)), then
1
(A.12) c(x1,y,v) =(!) (g(y)—m) f(y) [1F(y)]"1 dy
and by integration by parts where
v(y) =(g(y)—m)f(y) v(y) = (g(t)—
m)f(t) dt
V(y) =(1_F(y))v_ldy V(y) =- (v_1)(1_F(y))vf(y) dy
and rearranging terms, we get
(A.13) c(x,y,v) =v(v—1) (g(t) —m)f(t) dt [1—F(y)]2 f(y) dy
By transformation of variables, where F =F(y)
and (F) =
1
1y(F) gt f(t) dt is the concentration curve
we get— 30—
c(x,y,v)=v(v—1).f1[$(F) —F][1FJ''2 dp
which means that the concentration ratio is equal to the area between the
concentration curve and the 450 line.
Note that the difference between the concentration ratios is hence
the (weighted) difference between the concentration curves.— 31—
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